9 pages., via online journal., Residents of Mexico City experience major hydrological risks, including flooding events and insufficient potable water access for many households. A participatory modeling project, MEGADAPT, examines hydrological risk as co-constructed by both biophysical and social factors and aims to explore alternative scenarios of governance. Within the model, neighborhoods are represented as agents that take actions to reduce their sensitivity to exposure and risk. These risk management actions (to protect their households against flooding and scarcity) are based upon insights derived from focus group discussions within various neighborhoods. We developed a role-playing game based on the model's rules in order to validate the assumptions we made about residents' decision-making given that we had translated qualitative information from focus group sessions into a quantitative model algorithm. This enables us to qualitatively validate the perspective and experience of residents in an agent-based model mid-way through the modeling process. Within the context of described hydrological events and the causes of these events, residents took on the role of themselves in the game and were asked to make decisions about how to protect their households against scarcity and flooding. After the game, we facilitated a discussion with residents about whether or not the game was realistic and how it could be improved. The game helped to validate our assumptions, validate the model with community members, and reinforced our connection with the community. We then discuss the potential further development of the game as a learning and communication tool.
Yoder, Landon (author), Chowdhury, Rinku Roy (author), and School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University
Graduate School of Geography, Clark University
Format:
Journal article
Publication Date:
2018
Published:
Elsevier
Location:
Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Box: 16 Document Number: D10459
8 pages., Via online journal., Agricultural nonpoint source pollution remains a pressing environmental problem despite decades of policy and environmental initiatives. Cooperative local actions are a crucial element of effective multilevel governance solutions to such problems, but securing farmer participation for water quality protection remains challenging. Social capital—relations of trust, reciprocity, and shared social norms within and between key stakeholder groups—has been found to enable cooperation for environmentally desirable outcomes. However, the downsides of social capital remain under-examined in multilevel governance, where cooperation within one stakeholder group (bonding social capital) may undermine cooperation with other stakeholders (bridging social capital). Given this important gap, researchers need to examine how bonding and bridging social capital may be formed, maintained, or undermined through stakeholder interactions, and the corresponding environmental consequences.
In this paper, we address these gaps through a case study of south Florida’s sugar-producing region, whose drainage water flows south into the Florida Everglades. In contrast to persistent water quality impairment elsewhere, Everglades water quality has improved steadily over the past 20 years. These improvements have taken place under a complex set of governance arrangements that established a mandatory long-term numeric water quality target but which relies on shared compliance among farms. These dynamics encouraged interactions among three key groups of stakeholders—farmers, agricultural extension agents, and state regulators—to implement management changes. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, we find that bonding social capital among farmers encourages them to improve their management through a sense of shared responsibility, while also potentially limiting restoration by maintaining perceptions that the regulations are unfair. Bridging social capital helps to legitimize new management efforts, while court-mandated water quality targets incentivize farmers to draw on multiple forms of social capital. We also discuss the relevance of this case for governing agricultural nonpoint source pollution in similar settings elsewhere.