Bruns, Catherine J. (author / James Madison University)
Format:
Book chapter
Publication Date:
2019
Published:
USA
Location:
Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Box: 102 Document Number: D10901
Notes:
See also D10895., Pages 171-178 in Brigitta R. Brunner and Corey A. Hickerson (editors), Cases in public relations: translating ethics into action. Oxford University Press, New York City, New York. 359 pages., Author examines the actions, accountability and ethical stance of government agencies in communicating environment risk to citizens in Flint, Michigan.
Online via the publication. 3 pages., Findings of a poll by The Packer indicated that "properly administered social responsibility programs
do exactly that, or at least can be a significant factor in helping accomplish that goal." They can help ensure that workers are treated well according to health and safety standards and compensated fairly. Such programs also provide to the wider company a greater sense of purpose that workers' jobs
contribute to something greater than profits.
Online from publisher. 4 pages., Article features findings of a Packer survey about social responsibility. The summary includes brief responses by 11 leaders in the produce industry about the meaning of social responsibility.
19 pages, 19 pages, The price fluctuation in agricultural markets is an obstacle to poverty reduction for small-scale farmers in developing countries. We build a microfoundation to study how farmers with heterogeneous production costs, under price fluctuations, make crop-planting decisions over time to maximize their individual welfare. We consider both strategic farmers, who rationally anticipate the near-future price as a basis for making planting decisions, and naive farmers, who shortsightedly react to the most recent crop price. The latter behavior may cause recurring overproduction or underproduction, which leads to price fluctuations. We find it important to cultivate a sufficient number of strategic farmers because their self-interested behavior alone, made possible by sufficient market information, can reduce price volatility and improve total social welfare. In the absence of strategic farmers, a well-designed preseason buyout contract, offered by a social entrepreneur or a for-profit firm to a fraction of contract farmers, brings benefit to farmers as well as to the firm itself. More strikingly, the contract not only equalizes the individual welfare in the long run among farmers of the same production cost, but it also reduces individual welfare disparity over time among farmers with heterogeneous costs regardless of whether they are contract farmers or not. On the other hand, a nonsocially optimal buyout contract may reflect a social entrepreneur's over-subsidy tendency or a for-profit firm's speculative incentive to mitigate but not eliminate the market price fluctuation, both preventing farmers from achieving the most welfare.
