Rose, Kathleen M. (author), Howell, Emily L. (author), Su, Leona Yi-Fan (author), Xenos, Michael A. (author), Brossard, Dominique (author), and Scheufele, Dietram A. (author)
Format:
Online journal article
Publication Date:
2019
Published:
SAGE Journals
Location:
Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Box: 32 Document Number: D10600
19 pages., via online journal., The impact of knowledge on public attitudes toward scientific issues remains unclear, due in part to ill-defined differences in how research designs conceptualize knowledge. Using genetically modified foods as a framework, we explore the impacts of perceived familiarity and factual knowledge, and the moderating roles of media attention and a food-specific attitudinal variable (food consciousness), in shaping these relationships. Based on the differential effects on “negative attitudes” toward genetically modified foods, we provide further evidence that the measures of knowledge are separate concepts and argue against a one-dimensional view of scientific knowledge. We discuss implications for understanding the relationship between knowledge and science attitudes.
21 pages., via online journal., Scholars are divided over whether communicating to the public the existence
of scientific consensus on an issue influences public acceptance of the
conclusions represented by that consensus. Here, we examine the
influence of four messages on perception and acceptance of the scientific
consensus on the safety of genetically modified organisms (GMOs): two
messages supporting the idea that there is a consensus that GMOs are safe
for human consumption and two questioning that such a consensus exists.
We found that although participants concluded that the pro-consensus
messages made stronger arguments and were likely to be more
representative of the scientific community’s attitudes, those messages did
not abate participants’ concern about GMOs. In fact, people’s premanipulation attitudes toward GMOs were the strongest predictor of of our outcome variables (i.e. perceived argument strength, post-message GMO
concern, perception of what percent of scientists agree). Thus, the results
of this study do not support the hypothesis that consensus messaging
changes the public’s hearts and minds, and provide more support, instead,
for the strong role of motivated reasoning.
24 pages., via online journal., The present study investigated the effects of communication styles, source expertise, and audiences’ preexisting attitudes in the contexts of the debate regarding genetically modified organisms. A between-subject experiment (N = 416) was conducted manipulating communication styles (aggressive vs. polite) and the expertise of the communicator (scientist vs. nonscientist) in blog articles. The results showed significant effects of communicator expertise and individuals’ preexisting attitudes on writer likability and message quality, depending on the communication style used. Expectancy violation was found as a significant mediator that explains the differences. These findings provided a plausible explanation for the way in which communication styles work in science communication contexts and offered practical implications for science communicators to communicate more strategically.
28 pages, via online journal, While uncertainty is central to science, many fear negative effects of communicating scientific uncertainties to the public, though research results about such effects are inconsistent. Therefore, we test the effects of four distinct uncertainty frame types (deficient, technical, scientific, consensus) on three outcomes (belief, credibility, behavioral intentions) across three science issues (climate change, GMO food labeling, machinery hazards) with an experiment using a national sample (N = 2,247) approximating U.S. census levels of age, education, and gender. We find portraying scientific findings using uncertainty frames usually does not have significant effects, with an occasional exception being small negative effects of consensus uncertainty.
