Dasgupta, S. (author), Knight, T.O. (author), Devadoss, S. (author), and Love, H.A. (author)
Format:
Conference paper
Publication Date:
1998-09
Published:
USA
Location:
Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Box: 107 Document Number: C10134
Notes:
search from AgEcon., American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, August 2-5, 1998, Salt Lake City, Utah. 13 pages; Adobe Acrobat PDF 83K bytes., Share contracts under information asymmetry often involve input application and risk sharing inefficiency. These
difficulties are nullified under full information which can be approximated in repeated contracts. We give evidence of
cooperation in repeated contracts, indicating the existence of full information efficiency and efficient resource use, despite
underlying information asymmetry.
