Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Document Number: C16993
Notes:
Pages 3-22 in Steven A. Wolf (ed.), Privatization of information and agricultural industrialization. CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida. 299 pages, This chapter originated as part of a workshop held at the University of Wisconsin-Madison on October 25-26, 1995. Theme of the workshop: "Privatization of information and technology transfer in U.S. agriculture: research and policy implications."
Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Box: 107 Document Number: C10137
Notes:
search from AgEcon., Faculty Paper 98-03. 25 p., Agribusinesses in the cattle-beef sector use information from both external sources and proprietary sources in the
management decision making process. This research reports the results of personal interviews with employees at all levels of the beef market channel, covering the information resources that they value and the priority their firms place on information. Respondents used data on prices and cattle inventories collected by the public sector, data on retail grocery sales made available through private firms, and data and analysis from trade associations. Companies involved in meat packing and retail distribution use information technologies to automate delivery and billing for products and they are investing in improved systems. A barrier to a more efficient supply chain in beef is the incomplete implementation of retail scanner systems for fresh meat.
Dasgupta, S. (author), Knight, T.O. (author), Devadoss, S. (author), and Love, H.A. (author)
Format:
Conference paper
Publication Date:
1998-09
Published:
USA
Location:
Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Box: 107 Document Number: C10134
Notes:
search from AgEcon., American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, August 2-5, 1998, Salt Lake City, Utah. 13 pages; Adobe Acrobat PDF 83K bytes., Share contracts under information asymmetry often involve input application and risk sharing inefficiency. These
difficulties are nullified under full information which can be approximated in repeated contracts. We give evidence of
cooperation in repeated contracts, indicating the existence of full information efficiency and efficient resource use, despite
underlying information asymmetry.
