11pgs, Across the European Union, the receipt of agricultural subsidisation is increasingly being predicated on the delivery of public goods. In the English context, in particular, these changes can be seen in the redirection of money to the new Environmental Land Management scheme. Such shifts reflect the changed expectations that society is placing on agriculture—from something that provides one good (food) to something that supplies many (food, access to green spaces, healthy rural environment, flood resilience, reduced greenhouse gas emissions). Whilst the reasons behind the changes are well documented, understanding how these shifts are being experienced by the managers expected to deliver on these new expectations is less well understood. Bourdieu’s social theory and the good farmer concept are used to attend to this blind spot, and to provide timely insight as the country progresses along its public goods subsidy transition. Evidence from 65 interviews with 40 different interviewees (25 of whom gave a repeat interview) show a general willingness towards the transition to a public goods model of subsidisation. The optimisation and efficiency that has historically characterised the productivist identity is colouring the way managers are approaching the delivery of public goods. Ideas of land sparing and land sharing (and the farming preference for the former over the latter) are used to help understand these new social and attitudinal realities.
13pgs, Sufficient access to and utilization of broadband is an ongoing concern for rural economic development. Using a rural region in Northern New York (USA), we consider the investment and operational costs of a broadband cooperative and determine service prices for which it is financially viable. Service prices need to increase 75%–131%, depending on grant restrictions, relative to existing market prices for a new broadband cooperative to become financially feasible. Put differently, the cooperative would not cash flow at market prices unless there was at least 14 potential subscribers per mile at a 62% take rate. For a cooperative, the grant restriction that providers offer a minimum level of speed at a maximum price results in a high level of subsidization by high-speed to low-speed members to support the business. Given grant funding and member equity investments, financial infeasibility has little to do with construction costs, than with annual operational and maintenance costs required to sustain the system long term. More reasonable feasibility scenarios occur for existing utility cooperatives expanding services into broadband, particularly areas with a high proportion of high-speed, year-round users and strong take rates. Consideration of public benefits of broadband arguably needs to be added to the equation, particularly surrounding access to healthcare and educational purposes, and as a prerequisite to supporting taxpayer-funded public-private partnerships to expand broadband services. Policy levers to eliminate or subsidize property taxes and pole rental costs reduce cash flow prices considerably; however, feasibility is highly sensitive to assumed take rates.
