9 pages, via online journal, Grain marketing arrangements in modern Russia are far from what they were in the 1990s. Given that grain marketing is crucial for farm revenues and an adequate functioning of the agri-food system, this paper examines why different grain marketing contracts co-exist and how well they fit the local agri-food context. Semi-structured interviews with farmers, grain buyers and regional authorities were conducted in the region of Tyumen in 2013-2014. The analysis, grounded in new institutional economics, found that the traders’ contracts, compared to those offered by grain elevators, are often better suited to account for uncertainty as a salient property of marketing transactions, but discourage quality improvements and differentiation of grain. Furthermore, both contract types encourage strategic behaviour on the part of grain buyers. The paper also discusses the case in a broader theoretical and international context and offers a number of policy implications, such as those related to independent grain quality assessments and extension.
Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Document Number: C17329
Notes:
A paper presented at the 18th International Conference of Agricultural Economists., Pages 257-261 in Bruce L. Greenshields and Margot A. Bellamy (eds), Rural development: growth and equity. International Association of Agricultural Economists Occasional Paper No. 3. Gower Publishing Company Limited, England. 312 pages.
16 pages., via online journal., Fraudulent activities in the international honey market affect 10% of food, and cost the global food market $50 billion per annum. Although many developed countries have created regulations to combat food fraud, illegally imported honey, especially originating from China, still enters through transshipments and relabelling to mask its true origin. This honey laundering poses a health risk to consumers, as Chinese honey potentially contains illegal and unsafe antibiotics and high levels of herbicides and pesticides. We analyse whether information about the negative health impacts of laundered honey increases the proportion of consumers willing to pay a premium for local fraud‐free honey. Using a laboratory experiment, we find when consumers are given honey laundering information, their willingness to pay a premium for local fraud‐free honey increases by as much as 27 percentage points. Our findings suggest that by conveying honey laundering information and guaranteeing their honey is fraud‐free, producers can potentially increase revenues and reduce the prevalence of food fraud. Our results further show that consumers' preference for various honey characteristics and age also influence the probability of paying a premium for local honey.
