19 pages., via online journal., Vegetable farming is the main source of livelihood for smallholder farmers in Eswatini. However, the production and marketing challenges they faced inhibits the farmers from benefiting fully, which calls for relational transactions to enhance exchange efficiency. Therefore, this study aims to determine the nature of relationship constructs between vegetable farmers selling to formal and informal channels. Data elicited from 170 farmers were analysed using factor analysis, multiple regression analysis and discriminant analysis. Results revealed that farmers derived satisfaction from the price offered and communication, while trust was derived from satisfaction, communication and duration of the relationship, and commitment was derived from trust in both channels. The discriminant analysis results revealed that there is statistical significant difference between the channels. Farmers supplying formal markets perceived levels of satisfaction, trust, and commitment better than those supplying informal markets. The results also indicated that satisfaction and trust were the best predictors of the nature of the relationships. The lack of written contracts and low produce quantity purchased by the formal markets contributes to the low-level establishment of the farmer-buyer relationships. Therefore, coordinated supply chains and supplier-development approaches are necessary to complement the logistical requirements associated with fresh produce and to create mutual benefits.
9 pages, via online journal, Grain marketing arrangements in modern Russia are far from what they were in the 1990s. Given that grain marketing is crucial for farm revenues and an adequate functioning of the agri-food system, this paper examines why different grain marketing contracts co-exist and how well they fit the local agri-food context. Semi-structured interviews with farmers, grain buyers and regional authorities were conducted in the region of Tyumen in 2013-2014. The analysis, grounded in new institutional economics, found that the traders’ contracts, compared to those offered by grain elevators, are often better suited to account for uncertainty as a salient property of marketing transactions, but discourage quality improvements and differentiation of grain. Furthermore, both contract types encourage strategic behaviour on the part of grain buyers. The paper also discusses the case in a broader theoretical and international context and offers a number of policy implications, such as those related to independent grain quality assessments and extension.
