The CIA created a covert operation called JM WAVE which was based in South Miami. It's mission was to assassinate [Fidel Castro] and repatriate this area's Cubans back to their land. This undertaking had over 15,000 exiles on it's bankroll and had a budget of over $50 million dollars, which is worth over $350 million dollars in today's market.
Last May, President Bush signed an Executive Order allowing the Coast Guard to immediately turn back Haitian boat refugees without checking to determine if they were fleeing political persecution. Before that, thousands of Haitians had crowded into unsafe boats to try to get away from their dangerous homeland. The U.S. tagged them "economic" rather than political refugees. "The fact is our government has turned a blind eye to Haitians," said Wade Henderson, director of NAACP's Washington bureau. I have a dream that I intend to make a reality. I'm calling on African Americans and Haitians here in Miami to come together to sit down, talk and work out a plan to help Haitians. But I'm also asking that Hispanics, Jews, Anglos -- everyone -- pitch in to help.
Journal Article, Examines the experiences of Afro-Cuban immigrants in non-traditional settlement sites in the Southwest. Drawing on 45 interviews with Afro-Cubans in Austin, Texas and Albuquerque, New Mexico, the authors explore how respondents position themselves relative to the local Mexican-origin population. Specifically focuses on the implications of 'Hispanic' identity in these cities as a category that is heavily tied to Mexican origin, 'brownness,' and the suspicion of illegality. As Afro-Cubans, respondents face a different racialization process than many non-black Latino immigrants, in that their blackness marks them as outside the bounds of regional constructions of Hispanic identity.
Examines the voting behavior of Cubans and non-Cuban Hispanics in two Florida counties. The group position thesis holds that status inequalities and perceived discrimination yield out-group hostilities that can influence political behavior. In Miami, where Cubans are dominant, we expect non-Cuban Latinos to report greater pan-Latino competition and that anti-Cuban attitudes will influence non-Cuban Hispanic voting. In Tampa, where non-Cuban Latinos live in communities where Cubans are not dominant, we expect lower levels of perceived competition and Cuban-related attitudes to be inconsequential to the vote. The results confirm that power relations in the local arena constitute an important influence on the political behavior of Latino immigrants.