20 pages., via online journal., This article analyses whether different institutional sources of scientific information have an impact on its credibility. Through a population-based survey experiment of a national representative sample of the Spanish public, we measure the credibility that citizens attribute to scientific information on the evolution of CO2 emissions disclosed by different institutional sources (business associations, government, non-government environmental organisations, international bodies and national research institutions). The findings show that an institutional credibility gap exists in science communication. We also investigate the factors accounting for the credibility of the different institutional sources by examining variables related to knowledge, interest, trust, reputation, deference, attitudes, values and personal characteristics. Exploratory regression analyses reveal that identical variables can produce different effects on the credibility of scientific information, depending on the institutional source to which it is attributed.
Ranjan, Pranay (author), Wardroppe, Chloe B. (author), Eanes, Francis R. (author), Reddy, Sheila M. W. (author), Harden, Seth C. (author), Masuda, Yuta J. (author), and Prokopy, Linda S. (author)
Format:
Online journal article
Publication Date:
2019-01
Published:
USA: Science Direct
Location:
Agricultural Communications Documentation Center, Funk Library, University of Illinois Box: 8 Document Number: D10297
10 pages., Via online journal., Agricultural conservation programs often focus on farm operators when promoting conservation practices. However, much of U.S. farmland is owned by landowners not directly involved in farm operations. Rental arrangements on these lands can dis-incentivize the adoption of conservation practices that could improve soil health, water quality, and land values. To date, agricultural conservation policy has largely ignored the role of non-operating landowners (NOLs) and rental arrangements. We help improve the evidence-base for policy by identifying barriers to adoption of conservation practices on rented farmlands. Analysis of forty interviews with NOLs, operators, farm managers and university extension personnel in Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana revealed five categories of barriers: cash rent lease terms, rental market dynamics, information deficits/asymmetries, cognitive/interpersonal, and financial motivations. Some barriers, such as risk aversion and farm aesthetics were expressed by both NOLs and operators, while other barriers, such as status quo bias and annual renewal of leases were only expressed by NOLs and operators, respectively. To overcome barriers to conservation, interviewees recommended improving communication between NOLs and operators and modifying cash rent lease terms in order to build in flexibility for equitable sharing of risks and rewards. Agricultural conservation programs could readily apply these results—possibly working with intermediaries (e.g., farm managers, lawyers)—to offer communication and lease tools and assistance to NOLS and operators. Future research should evaluate the efficacy of these conservation interventions and how intermediaries affect the balance of power between NOLs and operators.
9 pages., Via online journal., Using an agent-based model we explore the model of slavery in modern business developed by Crane (2013). Taking the Spanish agricultural sector—specifically the area of Campo de Dalías in Almería where much of Europe's vegetables are grown—as a case, we find that labour exploitation flourishes in communities of like-minded companies that do not care about mainstream norms. We confirm which socio-economic aspects of labour demand/supply lead to slavery, while challenging the assumption that markets which are dominated by few employers are more prone to exploiting workers. We find that, regarding isolation and connectedness of employers, cluster effects and intense inter-employer communication are particularly effective drivers of underpayment if the cluster is homogenous in terms of wage level and if it is isolated from law-abiding employers. This means that employers tend to confirm and reinforce each other in their illegal behaviour, thus creating enclaves in which non-standard norms prevail and worker exploitation is regarded as legitimate. On the other hand, we see that breaking the isolation of employees among each other only increases pay levels if there are law-abiding employers, pointing to the potentially beneficial role social business and entrepreneurs, state-owned companies, or public entrepreneurs could play for transforming labour conditions of entire markets.
