7 pages., via online journal, There are approximately 65 dairy farms in Mississippi (Gregory, 2019) with an estimated annual milk value of $26 million (Mississippi Farm Bureau, n.d.). Mastitis is the most expensive disease in the dairy industry (Neeser, Hueston, Godden, & Bey, 2006) and can decrease milk production by 1,181 kg per lactation in multiparous cows (Wilson et al., 2004). Clinical mastitis accounts for the largest use of antibiotics in livestock species (Thomson, Rantala, Hautala, Pyörälä, & Kaartinen, 2008), a circumstance that raises concerns of antimicrobial resistance (Pol & Ruegg, 2007; Wang et al., 2015) and increases producer expenses due to purchasing antibiotics and discarding milk during treatment (Rollin, Dhuyvetter, & Overton, 2015). On-farm bacteriological culturing (OFBC) enables producers to distinguish among broad categories of microorganisms with great accuracy and provides results within 24 hr, versus approximately a week when cultures are sent to a laboratory (Down, Bradley, Breen, & Green, 2017). Despite the availability of several viable OFBC systems, adoption of OFBC in Mississippi has been limited.
The purpose of the study reported here was to implement and evaluate an OFBC pilot test with a small sample of Mississippi dairy producers. The objectives of the study were
to identify reasons for producers' lack of OFBC adoption,
to explore change in producers' knowledge and perceptions of OFBC before and after trial, and
to assess the effectiveness of an Extension-led trialing program relative to OFBC adoption.
9 pages., Via online journal., Using an agent-based model we explore the model of slavery in modern business developed by Crane (2013). Taking the Spanish agricultural sector—specifically the area of Campo de Dalías in Almería where much of Europe's vegetables are grown—as a case, we find that labour exploitation flourishes in communities of like-minded companies that do not care about mainstream norms. We confirm which socio-economic aspects of labour demand/supply lead to slavery, while challenging the assumption that markets which are dominated by few employers are more prone to exploiting workers. We find that, regarding isolation and connectedness of employers, cluster effects and intense inter-employer communication are particularly effective drivers of underpayment if the cluster is homogenous in terms of wage level and if it is isolated from law-abiding employers. This means that employers tend to confirm and reinforce each other in their illegal behaviour, thus creating enclaves in which non-standard norms prevail and worker exploitation is regarded as legitimate. On the other hand, we see that breaking the isolation of employees among each other only increases pay levels if there are law-abiding employers, pointing to the potentially beneficial role social business and entrepreneurs, state-owned companies, or public entrepreneurs could play for transforming labour conditions of entire markets.
